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Corporate donations and shareholder value 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Do corporate donations enhance shareholder wealth or reflect agency problems? We address this 
question for a global sample of firms whereby we distinguish between charitable and political donations, as well 
as between donations in cash and in kind. We find that charitable donations are positively related to financial 
performance and firm value, which is consistent with the value-enhancement hypothesis. This positive effect on 
firm value is stronger for cash than in-kind donations. In contrast, political donations do not appear to enhance 
shareholder value, but rather tend to reflect agency problems, as they are higher for firms with poor internal 
corporate governance and strong managerial entrenchment. We address endogeneity concerns by using peer firms’ 
donations as an instrument in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) setting and by conducting a difference-in-
difference analysis around a general election. 
 
I. Introduction 
More and more companies strive for a reputation of “giving back to society” by means of donations. 
A 2014 survey among 261 leading firms worldwide (CECP, 2014a) concludes that the amount of 
corporate philanthropy totals $25 billion, with a median of $18 million per company which is equivalent 
to 1.01% of pre-tax profits, 0.13% of revenues, or $644 of per employee. When zooming in on the 
industry level, industrial and energy companies are at the bottom with donations of only 0.76% of pre-
tax income, which stands in marked contrast with the healthcare and consumer discretionary1 sectors as 
top contributors with 1.58% and 1.25% of pre-tax income, respectively. The main beneficiaries are 
educational organizations capturing 28% of the total donations, followed by health & social services 
with 27% (CECP, 2014b). The amount of donations keeps growing; it has augmented by about 40% over 
the past decade. 2 
Corporate philanthropy can be defined in many ways; the most widely accepted definition is the one 
from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (1993), which defines it as “an unconditional transfer 
of cash or other assets to an entity or a settlement, or cancellation of its liabilities in a voluntary 
nonreciprocal transfer by another entity acting other than as an owner.” Thus, as summarized by Gautier 
and Pache (2015), corporate philanthropy concerns voluntary donations of corporate resources to 
charitable causes. As corporate philanthropy consists of pro-social behavior, it is considered as part of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) that involves explicit pro-social spending (Shapira, 2012; Liang 
                                                     
1 The consumer discretionary sector offer goods or services to consumers that are non-necessities, such as automobiles, 
high-end apparel, restaurants, and luxury goods.   
2
 Based on average corporate donations of our sample firms increasing from 0.14% of sales in 2004 up to 0.20% of sales in 
2013. 
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and Renneboog, 2016). We can partition donations on the basis of the type of beneficiary: charitable and 
political donations, but can also dissect total charitable donations on the basis of the type of payment: 
cash and in-kind donations. An important mechanism for distributing donations is the corporate 
foundation/trust; a good third of corporate donations are made via a corporate foundation (CECP, 2015). 
In the remainder of this study, we will interchangeably use the terms corporate philanthropy, 
contributions, giving, and donations.  
For society as a whole, corporate philanthropy may yield important benefits (to non-shareholders) 
that can increase social welfare. However, altruism comes at a cost because corporate giving lowers tax 
revenues and some donations, for instance those aimed at fulfilling politicians’ agendas may not be pro-
social. The scope of this study, however, is limited to the implications for shareholder wealth. At first 
sight, corporate philanthropy may seem inconsistent with maximizing shareholder wealth, because 
giving money or other assets away contradicts the commercial, profit-making purpose of a company 
(Friedman, 1970). According to such rationales, grouped under the agency theory, the primary reason 
why managers would still decide to donate is because it satisfies their personal altruistic needs or yields 
other private benefits. In other words, managers serve their own interests at the expense of the 
shareholders. In contrast, the value-enhancement view argues that corporate philanthropy increases the 
value of the firm. Donations could function as a kind of marketing tool, indirect cost saving mechanism, 
community-oriented investment, or mechanisms to bond employees to the company, and as such 
improve corporate financial performance. In addition, corporate donations can also solve a collective 
action problem as it is difficult to aggregate individual investors’ donations such that they have a strong 
enough impact on society. If corporate philanthropy can serve the purpose of passing through 
individuals’ donations and make a bigger impact to society, investors may perceive it favorably, 
consistent with the value-enhancement view. Although there has been a noteworthy body of research in 
the area of corporate philanthropy, the causal effect on firm value is still ambiguous. Consequently, the 
two contradictory theories both find support in the literature (e.g. Seifert, Morris, & Bartkus, 2004; Wang 
& Qian, 2011; Masulis & Reza, 2015). Of course, these views are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as 
corporate philanthropy can on the one hand fulfil managers’ self-interest, and can on the other hand 
enhance financial performance due to tax savings or reputation building. Which effects are more 
dominant is mostly an empirical question. 
We first examine the agency hypothesis by linking corporate donations and the use of corporate 
foundations to measures of internal and external corporate governance that can capture the relative power 
of managers and shareholders, and of shareholders’ protection as regulated by law. Second, the value-
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enhancement view is examined by relating corporate donations to measures of current and future firm 
value and financial performance. Given that this relation between donations and firm value may be 
endogenous since doing well may enable a firm to do good (e.g. Seifert, Morris & Bartkus, 2004), we 
employ an instrumental variable approach by using peer firms’ donations as an IV and also conduct a 
difference-in-differences analysis.  
The results suggest that charitable donations are associated with higher shareholder value for the 
largest listed corporations around the world. First, charitable donations are not strongly correlated with 
internal and external corporate governance. Charitable donations do not occur more in firms where 
management is entrenched, nor do we see less corporate philanthropy in firms with stronger shareholder 
power. This casts doubt on the view that considers charitable donations as an agency problem. Second, 
charitable giving is positively correlated with current and future measures of firm value and profitability 
(Tobin’s Q, ROA, and sales growth). This positive relation is stronger for charitable donations in cash 
than for in-kind donations. We use an instrumental variable approach (using peers’ donations as 
instruments for the focal firm’s donations) to address the endogeneity problem between donations and 
firm value/profitability and show that the causation goes from donations to value and not vice versa. 
Third, distributing funds by means of a corporate foundation is correlated with poor internal governance 
and strong managerial power (as measured by the presence of golden parachutes, M&A limitations, 
larger board size, anti-takeover devices, CEO-chairman duality, and the corporate governance E-index), 
and poor external governance which is here equivalent to the absence of large shareholder monitoring. 
While one may interpret the use of a corporate foundation an agency problem, the fact that a foundation 
is positively related with current and future firm value casts doubt on this interpretation. Our findings 
are more in line with a foundation helping to ensure that donations are spent in the best interest of the 
firm and that they are actually a solution to the agency problems in the firm related to donations. Fourth, 
political donations do appear to be related to agency problems: they are associated with various 
indicators of poor internal corporate governance and managerial entrenchment and are unrelated to firm 
value and financial performance. A difference-in-differences analysis around the 2010 UK elections 
does not reveal any positive effect on the firm value of companies with political donations.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it adds to the literature on 
corporate philanthropy. In contrast to previous studies suggesting that corporate philanthropy reflects an 
agency problem (Fich, Garcia, Robinson & Yore, 2009; Masulis & Reza, 2015), this paper finds that 
donations by a global sample of large public firms can positively affect corporate value and financial 
profitability, thereby offering a different perspective that is more in line with the value-enhancement 
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view of corporate philanthropy. Moreover, this paper adds to the literature on political giving and agency 
costs by means of a difference-in-difference approach and sheds light on the agency aspect of political 
donations. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to dissect corporate donations by 
studying giving in cash or in-kind assets. Our findings suggest that this differentiation by the form of 
giving is important as the positive effect of donations on firm value is prevalent for cash giving but less 
so for in-kind donations. Third, by examining donations in their corporate governance context, we can 
show the impact of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms as well as the effect of the 
regulatory framework on the relation between donations and firm value, an important aspect that is 
missing in the current literature which usually employs a single-country setting. Our focus on an 
international context helps to show how the relation between donations and shareholder value is related 
to legal investor protection at the country level.   
In the next section, we review the existing theories on the relation between corporate donations and 
value creation, whereupon the hypotheses will be formulated in the third section. The fourth section 
describes the data and explains the methodology. Section five contains the results of the empirical 
analysis and section six concludes.     
 
II. Literature Review 
The literature on corporate philanthropy stems from a broad field of disciplines, such as management, 
economics, finance, sociology, law, and ethics (for an eclectic summary, see Gautier and Pache (2013)).  
Given that we take a shareholder value perspective, we will focus in this subsection on the various forms 
of donations predominantly addressed in the financial literature (2.1), and on the prevailing theories 
regarding the drivers and outcomes of corporate philanthropy embedded in value-enhancement (2.2) 
theory and agency theory (2.3).  
 
2.1 Corporate philanthropy: different means of giving 
The various forms of corporate philanthropy can be differentiated according to (i) type of assets 
transferred (cash or in-kind assets3), (ii) method of transfer, and (iii) recipient of those assets. Yermack 
(2009) studies in-kind giving by US firms, but focuses only on stock donations. Other papers only 
account for cash donations (e.g. Brown et al., 2006) or do not make the distinction (e.g. Masulis & Reza, 
                                                     
3
 A third potential type of transfers is forgiveness of liabilities, which is usually not included in the definition of donations 
in the existing literature and neither will be in this study, because it is negligible for firms outside the financial sector. 
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2015). With regard to the transfer method, firms make charitable donations either via a direct giving 
program or a corporate foundation. A company-sponsored private foundation is a separate legal entity; 
it is exempt from taxes, receives funding from the parent, and some of the parent company’s employees 
or directors usually exert some degree of control the foundation. Giving by means of a foundation has 
several advantages: corporate managers can be excluded from decision making, which may facilitate a 
fair and objective decision process, and firms maintain more stable levels of donation payouts to charity 
while avoiding corporate timing of contributions to the foundation with respect to business cycle and tax 
purposes. The alternative to a foundation is a direct giving program that has the potential advantage that 
firms may not be required by international accounting standards to disclose all donations, the reason 
being that the donations to a variety of projects may—each individually—be small relative to the 
company’s assets (Petrovits, 2006; Shapira, 2012).4 There may still be specific disclosure thresholds 
imposed by stock exchanges or countries.5 In practice, foundations are common across all geographic 
regions, and most firms make use of both methods of transfer (direct or via foundations) at the same 
time (CECP, 2014).6 Brown et al. (2006) and Masulis & Reza (2015) argue that family foundations are 
more likely to be used for cash donations that benefit the insiders personally, and foundations have been 
shown to be associated with worse corporate governance.  
 
2.2 Value-enhancement view: corporate philanthropy as value-maximizing behavior 
According to the value-enhancement view, corporate donations may increase firm value. Although 
firms usually pretend to donate out of altruistic convictions, corporate philanthropy is often presented 
and justified by managers as shareholder value-enhancing. For example, companies may benefit from 
the goodwill generated by corporate giving, resulting in a higher employee morale and customer loyalty, 
and more lenient treatment by regulators or government officials (Brown et al., 2006). Although there is 
considerable support for such a value-enhancement theory in the literature, the empirical evidence is 
largely indirect. Navarro (1988) argues that donations enhance revenues through improving the firm’s 
reputation and increasing demand for the firm’s products, because there is a positive relation between 
                                                     
4
 Although donations are included in total corporate expenditures, they are not captured by the materiality requirements and 
consequently not itemized in financial reports.   
5
 For example, the NYSE requires companies to disclose donations in excess of USD one million to a charity institution 
affiliated with an independent director (Shapira, 2012), whereas the U.K. demands disclosure of donations larger than GBP 
200 (Brammer & Millington, 2005). 
6
 In more detail, 79% of companies in the U.S. operate a foundation, where cash donations by foundations account for 34% 
of total US giving. In Europe, foundations are also very common, where 74% of the companies maintains a foundation and 
42% of donations are made through foundations. Also in Asia, 60% of the firms has established a foundation and 33% of 
corporate donations are attributable to foundations (CECP, 2014). 
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advertising and the donations-to-sales ratio. This argument is in line with Schwartz (1968), who finds 
that charitable giving is a device to shift the demand curve for a firm’s products outwards. Although 
these studies suffer from serious endogeneity problems, more recent evidence points out that customers 
are willing to pay on average 6% more for identical products on Ebay when they are part of a charity 
auction (Elfenbein & McManus, 2010). More direct evidence is offered by Lev et al. (2010), who employ 
Granger causality tests to show that corporate philanthropy is associated with higher future revenues, 
particularly among firms that sell products directly to the general public. They also find a positive 
relation between contributions and customer satisfaction, which suggests that charitable giving is able 
to increase customer loyalty. 
Besides revenue-enhancement, corporate philanthropy can also contribute to firm value by means of 
cost reductions. “Profit-maximizing managers may use corporate contributions to reduce labor, capital, 
operating, or regulatory and governmental costs. In the labor market, for instance, workers may be 
willing to work for lower wages in communities that provide better recreational, educational, cultural, 
and health-related facilities. If the costs to the firms of financing such facilities are more than offset by 
the wage reductions, profits are increased.” (Navarro, 1988: 68) Moreover, corporate donations can bring 
about managerial perks for executives, such as meeting with celebrities at charity events. This could 
inspire employees to strive for promotion and form a far more cost-effectively method to motivate lower-
level personnel than equivalent amounts of salary (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). The more closely a company’s 
philanthropy is linked to the firm’s competitive context, the greater the company’s contribution to 
society will be, according to Porter and Kramer (2012).  
Furthermore, corporate donations may have a social impact that individual investors’ personal 
donations cannot easily achieve due to the small scale of individual donations. To the extent that 
companies are able to solve a collective action problem, they can be welfare enhancing by enabling 
society to move closer to its optimal level of charitable giving. Consequently, individuals and investors 
can respond favorably to corporate donations on their behalf.    
Although there appears to be, at best, some indirect empirical evidence of the value-enhancement 
view, the literature still lacks convincing evidence on the relation between donations and corporate 
financial performance. Due to the endogenous nature of the relation, it is hard to draw any conclusions 
on the causality. In a study on Chinese firms, Wang and Qian (2011) show that corporate donations 
enable firms to elicit positive stakeholder responses and gain political access, thereby improving 
corporate financial performance. This relation is particularly pronounced for companies with greater 
public visibility and a better past performance. The study also provides evidence that companies who 
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are not government-owned or politically well-connected enjoy greater benefits from corporate giving, 
as gaining access to political resources is critical in a Chinese context (Liang, Renneboog, and Sun, 
2015). In an US event study, Patten (2008) present some evidence that companies experience positive 
5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) after announcing donations to the relief effort following the 
2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, with CARs increasing with donation amounts.   
Conceptually, corporate donations could be part of an optimal contract with management, serving as 
some kind of indirect, low-profile or tax-advantageous compensation form. The reason that this cash-
outflow could still enhance shareholder value is because firms may adjust the wage of the managers 
downwards for the part of the corporate donations that benefits the managers personally. In addition, 
corporations receiving corporate philanthropy are mostly tax-exempt organizations (Shapira, 2012) and 
corporations making donations to qualified charitable organizations (which may include their own 
foundations) can deduct these amounts from their pre-tax income as gifts (Petrovits, 2006).7 This implies 
that the costs of donations are reduced by the marginal tax rate of the company (but the generated revenue 
will also be reduced by the marginal tax rate). If revenues induced by donations exceed the costs, 
donations could be profit maximizing. Whereas Navarro (1988) does not discover a significant relation 
between the federal tax rate and corporate giving, Boatsman and Gupta (1996) do report a negative 
relation between donations and the marginal tax rate, which they interpret as evidence that managers 
want to maintain some level of minimum net profit. In addition, tax incentives may affect both the timing 
of gifts and the long-run level of donations (Petrovits, 2006; Webb, 1994).8 The above tax considerations 
are consistent with the value-enhancement view of corporate philanthropy.  
 
2.3 Agency theory: corporate philanthropy as a managerial perk 
Companies are agents of their owners and as such they provide services on behalf of their owners as 
well as other parties in society. The agency hypothesis states that corporate philanthropy is the result of, 
or reflects, an agency problem between the manager and owners since managers (and directors) are likely 
to act in their own interests (Jensen, 2001). Managers engaging in private utility maximizing behavior 
could reduce total firm value. The literature presents various channels by which insiders can harvest 
private benefits from corporate philanthropy. A straightforward motivation behind corporate 
                                                     
7
 The extent to which donations are tax deductible may be limited in some countries. For instance, in the U.S., donations 
qualify for tax deductibility as long as they do not exceed 10% of pre-tax income in total (Shapira, 2012). 
8 Companies can receive a large up-front tax deduction after transferring money to foundations and pledging to use it for 
future donations. In some rare cases, firms even run their advertising campaigns out of their foundation. By already 
transferring these amounts up-front to their foundation, this allows them in fact to expense several years of advertising costs 
up front (Petrovits, 2006). 
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philanthropy is to do good. In accordance, the most common rationale provided by managers is that their 
firms have a moral obligation to the communities in which they operate. If corporate donations are 
genuinely made out of an altruistic motivation, it will lack the expectation of a direct quid-pro-quo 
(Shapira, 2012). Obviously, this may clash with the commercial, profit-making aim of a company and, 
therefore, corporate giving for altruistic reasons may satisfy the personal need of managers or directors 
to do good but may come at the expense of shareholders, which makes this motivation also an agency 
issue. Corporate giving can enable managers and directors to support their own pet charities, which 
means that they pursue private objectives at the expense of the firm (Brown et al., 2006). In addition, 
corporate giving creates some kind of ‘warm-glow’ effect for insiders, since they enhance their 
reputations as individuals who care about people and communities (Andreoni, 1990). Furthermore, it 
may provide insiders with benefits, such as tickets to events and access to celebrities. Executives may 
be keen to expand their networks and improve their own image at e.g. a charity gala or a celebrity golf 
tournament (Balotti & Hanks, 1999). Thus, corporate giving may enable managers to further their own 
objectives, boost their personal reputation, attract media attention, and advance their careers.  
The literature does provide some empirical evidence that donations are not related to corporate value: 
e.g. Fich, Garcia, Robinson and Yore et al. (2009) point out that corporate philanthropy is related to 
lower market-to-book ratios, sales margins, and market-adjusted returns. Consistently, investors place 
less value on the amount of corporate cash holdings for firms that maintain high levels of corporate 
giving (Masulis & Reza, 2015). Companies may adopt donations as a method of earnings management, 
since some firms use corporate foundations as off-balance sheet reserves (Petrovits, 2006). Similarly, 
firms may use corporate philanthropy to divert public attention away from financial results, and to buy 
goodwill after they have been required to restate suspected earnings (Koehn & Ueng, 2010). 
Furthermore, Yermack (2009) conclude that some CEOs fraudulently backdate stock gifts to increase 
personal income tax benefits, because those donations patterns are correlated with reporting delays after 
a drop in stock price. 
If donations reduce shareholder wealth and are to be regarded as an agency problem, one would 
expect a negative relation between donations and corporate governance mechanisms that increase 
monitoring of management. This is not the case in Adams and Hardwick (1998) who document that 
highly leveraged UK firms, which are expected to be effectively monitored by creditors, give more to 
charity. In contrast, after controlling for industry, state and fiduciary laws and regulation, Brown et al. 
(2006) also show that the leverage ratio is negatively related to both cash giving and the establishment 
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of a corporate foundation. Furthermore, Seifert et al. (2004) show that corporate philanthropy is 
positively related with organizational slack, measured by free cash-flow.  
Along these lines, management is said to be entrenched when “managers gain so much power that 
they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders” 
(Weisbach, 1988). The (widely-used) corporate governance G-index (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003), 
which is higher when the firm is less shareholder-oriented, is positively related to corporate philanthropy 
according to Fich et al. (2009), suggesting that firms who donate more also exhibit more agency 
problems. They also document that corporate donations are related to a larger board size, firm size, busy 
outside directors, and a low debt ratio. Masulis & Reza (2015) find a positive relation between the 
corporate governance E-index9, which also measures managerial entrenchment, and corporate giving 
(through foundations), and conclude that their findings is in line with their agency hypothesis. Likewise, 
ownership by blockholders and institutional owners is negatively associated with corporate donations 
(Seifert, Morris & Bartkus, 2002). While some of the above papers suffer from endogeneity issues and 
do not convincingly exclude reverse causality, Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016) apply an 
instrumental variable approach and conclude that corporate social responsibility (CSR), in general and 
in all its dimensions (including the social one which contains corporate philanthropy), is not an agency 
problem but is adopted by well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns.  
Some supporters of the agency view of argue that corporate donations are sometimes related to 
corporate political activities, which can be defined as “corporate attempts to shape government policy 
in ways favorable to the firm” (Baysinger, 1984). In the US, firms are not allowed to fund political 
campaigns directly, but can instead establish political action committees (PACs) to which firm directors, 
employees, and their families can donate.10 Outside the US, the vast majority of political donation data 
come from the UK where few restrictions for corporate donations to political parties and candidates 
                                                     
9
 According to Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009), there are only six provisions (out of the 24 in the G-index) that really 
matter in corporate governance (staggered/classified boards; poison pills; golden parachutes; the degree to which 
shareholders have power to decide on significant company transitions (such as M&As) by means of e.g. supermajority 
requirements; whether or not supermajority requirements for amendments of corporate charters or bylaws apply) which are 
combined into the E-index. The higher the index, the more powerful management is.  
10
 The PAC is allowed to support candidates up to a maximum of $5,000 per candidate per election, but since 2010, 
companies can also establish a super PAC (technically known as independent expenditure-only committees), which may 
raise unlimited sums of money from individuals as well as other companies and then spend unlimited amounts to overtly 
advocate for or against political candidates. Unlike traditional PACs, super PACs are prohibited from donating money 
directly to political candidates (Center for Responsive Politics, 2015). 
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exist, although donations of more than £5,000 to the main political party offices, or of more than £1,000 
to constituency or local party offices have to be disclosed (Library of Congress, 2015).11  
From an economic perspective, there are two prevailing views on political donations. First, although 
companies may not have a political preference, they have an economic interest in various legislative 
actions, regulatory decisions, or other political outcomes. Therefore, political donations represent an 
investment in political capital that can generate positive returns for the firm. Second, political giving 
may reflect managers’ personal political preferences that could come at the cost for shareholders 
(Aggarwal et al., 2012). A number of studies provide evidence consistent with the value-enhancement 
theory, showing a negative effect on firm value when politicians tied to the firm lose power and a positive 
effect when the connected politicians get elected (Faccio & Parsley, 2009; Jayachandran, 2006; Cooper, 
Gulen & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009). Other evidence is more in line with the 
agency theory: political donations are negatively associated with returns (Faccio, 2010; Aggarwal et al., 
2012) and political donations in the US are associated with a free cash flow problem, worse corporate 
governance, and a higher number of poor acquisitions (Duchin & Sosyura, 2012).   
 
III. Hypothesis Development 
We try to disentangle the two theories in relation to corporate philanthropy, namely the value-
enhancement and agency theories. According to the former, corporate philanthropy improves corporate 
value and financial performance, whereas the latter implies that corporate philanthropy merely enhances 
managerial self-interest at the expense of shareholders. There is an optimal level of corporate donations 
that can be determined via cost-benefit analysis (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), although, as long as 
this level is not reached, these theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, because donations could 
potentially contribute to firm value and at the same time serve managers’ personal aspirations. In order 
to determine which theory dominates, we relate corporate philanthropy to internal and external corporate 
governance, legal investor protection, and firm value when developing our hypotheses in this section.  
It is important to consider that donations are not homogenous: political and charitable donations have 
different types of recipients, and charitable donations can be made in cash or in-kind (pro-bono services, 
products, volunteer work, shares, and the support of research). Nevertheless, the latter could be more 
beneficial for shareholder wealth because many of these in-kind contributions are related to the core 
                                                     
11
 The other channel via which firms can engage in politics is corporate lobbying. Companies are allowed to make direct 
expenditures for lobbying up to an unlimited amount (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler (2004); Hill, Kelly, Lockhart & Van 
Ness, 2013), which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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business activities of a firm and the costs of in-kind giving might be lower. For instance, a 
pharmaceutical company’s development of a more cost effective treatment for emerging economies may 
lead to the establishment of a distribution network that the firm could use to expand its markets (Porter 
and Kramer, 2012). On the other hand, cash donations also have advantages: primarily, the recipient can 
use the proceeds in the way that best suits his or her needs and the donation can therefore be perceived 
by consumers and other stakeholders as a more genuine corporate gesture. Moreover, cash donations are 
very transparent by nature, since it is always clear what and how much is given away, and could also 
emit a signal to the market about strong future cash flows. Finally, cash donations can be transferred via 
a corporate foundation; and such a foundation or trust can facilitate a fair and objective decision making 
process, create timing advantages, guarantee  more transparency, and mitigate to a greater extent the 
probability that donations are used for private benefits.  
When the value-enhancement theory is correct, shareholders would have no reason to curb corporate 
donations. However, managers reaping private benefits from corporate philanthropy have an incentive 
to donate beyond the optimal level (from the firm’s perspective). In this case, shareholders will attempt 
to limit corporate giving. The extent to which shareholders are able to limit spending on corporate 
philanthropy depends on the corporate governance structure. We distinguish between internal 
governance that mainly concerns organizational-based provisions, and external governance that is 
related to the voting power. This enables us to formulate the first hypothesis: Total charitable donations 
(made in cash or in-kind assets), donations by means of a corporate foundation, and political 
donations are positively related to greater agency problems (Hypothesis 1). Empirically, we measure 
agency problems by means of the following measures that capture high managerial power: the presence 
of a staggered board, shareholder limitations to M&A decision making, supermajority requirements to 
change corporate charters and bylaws, golden parachutes, poison pills, the E-index (which aggregates 
the previous aspects of corporate governance), anti-takeover devices, board size, and CEO-chairman 
duality. 
A negative relation between external corporate governance and donations is also consistent with 
donations reflecting an agency problem (whereas an insignificant or positive relation would be in line 
with the value-enhancement view), as formulated in the second hypothesis: Total charitable donations 
(made in cash or in-kind assets), donations by means of a corporate foundation, and political 
donations are expected to be negatively related to external corporate governance, which suggest that 
donations reflect agency problems and do not contribute to firm value (Hypothesis 2). External 
corporate governance quality is empirically measured by ownership concentration, ownership by the 
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largest shareholder, the control wedge (cash-flow rights minus voting rights of the largest shareholder), 
and the type of the largest shareholder (that can be a financial institution, another company, an individual 
or family, the government). 
Besides the firm specific internal and external corporate governance mechanisms discussed above, 
country-level regulations can mitigate agency problems and investor expropriation (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000) and may also affect corporate philanthropy. One of the most important 
factors in shareholders’ legal rights are those addressing corporate voting procedures and decision-
making. The extent to which managers are subject to such shareholder influence is reflected in 
Spamann’s (2010) corrected Anti-Directors Rights Index (ADRI) of which a high value reflects that the 
law grants shareholders a high level of protection against management and a low value indicates that 
management is largely shielded from shareholder interference. Thus, if corporate donations reduce 
shareholder wealth, one would expect companies in countries with stronger shareholder protection by 
law (and hence more shareholder power) to make fewer donations, as similarly argued by Ferrell, Liang, 
and Renneboog (2016) in the broader context of CSR. This results in a third hypothesis: Total charitable 
donations (made in cash or in-kind assets), donations by means of a corporate foundation, and 
political donations are expected to be negatively related to stronger investor protection, because 
corporate donations reflect agency problems (Hypothesis 3).  
As mentioned above, the value-enhancement view implies that donations positively affect firm 
value. For example, donations can contribute to shareholder wealth via corporate reputation, revenue-
enhancement, cost reductions, and political goodwill (Lev et al, 2010; Navarro, 1988; Patten, 2008; 
Wang & Qian, 2011). In contrast, the agency view suggests that managers donate primarily to enhance 
their own interests, which suggests a negative effect on firm value. Potential channels for such a transfer 
of wealth from the firm to the manager are altruistic beliefs, the manager’s reputation, and connections 
established via corporate charity, earnings management, and personal tax effects (Fich et al., 2009; 
Masulis & Reza, 2015; Petrovits, 2006). Three measures of value and corporate financial performance 
are used, namely Tobin’s Q, ROA, and sales growth. A negative or insignificant relation between 
donations and firm value would be consistent with agency theory, whereas the alternative hypothesis 
predicts a positive relation and is consistent with the value-enhancement theory: Total charitable 
donations (in cash or in-kind assets), donations by means of a corporate foundation, and political 
donations are expected to be negatively related to firm value, in line with agency theory (Hypothesis 
4). 
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In contrast to charitable donations, donations to political organizations may reflect managerial 
agency problems. The effects of political contributions are particularly acute during political elections, 
as in that context the costs and benefits of donating to political organizations are amplified. For example, 
the loss of control of the incumbent political powers may negatively affect the value of firms with strong 
political ties to the forces that held power (Faccio & Parsley, 2009; Jayachandran, 2006; Fisman, 2001). 
The strength of the political ties can be proxied by the extent of political donations, since e.g. evidence 
from Brazil and the US shows that firms with high political contributions experience higher stock returns 
after elections that bring the supported politicians to power (Claessens et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2010). 
These studies support the value-enhancement theory of political donations since they may shape political 
decisions that favor the company. However, political giving may also reflect the personal political 
preferences of managers and benefit their personal career. Consistent with this idea, the literature shows 
that firms giving more to politics are associated with fraudulent behavior, free cash flow problems, bad 
corporate governance, and lower returns (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Duchin & Sosyura, 2012; Faccio, 2010; 
Yu & Yu, 2011). We empirically test the competing theories by means of a difference-in-differences 
approach applied to the 2010 general elections in the UK where virtually all political contributions have 
to be disclosed. If donations have a positive effect on firm value, these efforts should then pay-off, as 
the market is assumed to immediately incorporate all future benefits associated with political influence. 
So, if firm value increases more in 2010 for British companies that made larger political donations, the 
value-enhancement theory is not rejected, whereas an insignificant relation would fail to reject the 
agency theory. The effect of corporate political donations on firm value is expected to become (more) 
positive at elections (Hypothesis 5). 
 
IV. Data and methodology 
4.1.  Sample selection 
Our sample comprises publicly listed firms for which donation data are available in the Thomson 
Reuters ASSET4 database over the period 2004-2013, 2004 being the first year with substantial data 
coverage on this issue. ASSET4 collects this information from sustainability/CSR reports, company 
websites, annual reports, proxy filings, non-governmental organizations, and news from all the major 
providers. We then only retain the firms for which information is available in the following databases: 
Orbis (firm level ownership and control data), Worldscope (firm level accounting and financial data), 
and World Bank (country indices on legal issues, corruption, shareholder protection etc.). Our final 
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sample has a global coverage and contains 2,026 firms with firm-year observations amounting to 1,985, 
1,395, 3,226, and 8,976 for respectively cash, in-kind, political, and total donations. 12  
 
4.2 Variable definitions 
Corporate philanthropy  
We distinguish among different types of corporate giving: political donations comprise 
expenditures for political lobbying, support of political candidates, and contributions to parties. 
Monetary charitable giving falls under cash donations and other corporate charitable philanthropic 
expenses are categorized as in-kind donations, such as in-kind assets, shares, volunteer work, and 
research funded through the company’s foundations. Total charitable donations, the sum of cash and in-
kind giving, comprise charitable contributions in general. We scale the donation amounts, which are 
provided on an aggregated annual basis, by the firm’s total sales. Data on whether or not a firm has set 
up a corporate foundation to distribute its donations is also gathered from ASSET4. Detailed variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
Corporate financial performance 
Our main proxy for firm value in this paper is Tobin’s Q, the market value of total assets over the 
book value of total assets, which also has been used in prior research (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2009; Fich et 
al., 2009). This market-based measure is forward-looking and is assumed to reflect future profitability; 
it is not subject to accounting manipulations and does not fluctuate with scale. In addition, we also use 
accounting measures of corporate financial performance such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), yearly sales growth, and five-yearly sales growth. 
Corporate governance variables 
The main external governance variable measures the voting power held by the shareholder. Note 
that the voting power reflects the degree to which total ownership, thus both direct and indirect 
ownership, is concentrated in the hands of an ultimate owner. Furthermore, we collect data on the control 
wedge between cash-flow and voting rights, defined as cash flow rights minus voting rights of this 
largest (ultimate) shareholder. We also identify the type of largest shareholder: other corporations, 
financial institutions (mutual funds, pensions funds, insurance companies,…), individuals or families, 
and state owners (government or government institutions).  
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 Data on community lending, financing and investments is not included in this study, since it is negligible and not relevant for firms 
outside of the financial sector and cannot be considered as donations according to the ASSET4 ESG Data Glossary (2015) 
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We also collect the corporate governance measures that matter most according to Bebchuk et al. 
(2009): staggered boards, majority requirements for charter and bylaw amendments, limitations on the 
shareholder decision rights regarding takeovers, golden parachutes, and poison pills (the definitions are 
given in Appendix A). These five dummy variables on corporate governance provisions are compiled 
into an index that measures managerial entrenchment (the E-index) and gives equal weights to the above 
variables. More than half of our firms have two or more of these corporate governance provisions. In 
addition, we collect data on board size, CEO-chairman duality, the number of anti-takeover devices, and 
the dual class equity structure.13  
Country level variables 
The country-level scores on the Anti-Directors Rights Index (ADRI) are based on Spamann’s 
(2010) corrected version of the ADRI initially proposed by La Porta et al. (1998). The index is the sum 
of three dummy variables on shareholder voting (voting by mail, voting without blocking of shares, and 
calling an extraordinary meeting) and three dummy variables on minority protection (proportional board 
representation, pre-emptive rights, and judicial remedies). A higher value indicates stronger legal 
investor protection against managerial discretion on decision-making. Finally, GDP per capita captures 
country level effects related to the general level of welfare, which may affect some dimensions of CSR 
performance (Liang & Renneboog, 2016).  
Firm level control variables 
In prior research with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2009), the following 
control variables were also included: (lagged) Return on assets (ROA), firm size (total assets), Capex 
(capital expenditures-to-assets, leverage, research & development (R&D) expenditures, firm age (Fich 
et al., 2009), industry fixed effects (NACE rev. 2 code).  We follow the convention and use this standard 
set of controls. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our key variables. The average charitable donations 
amount $28.4 million per year, which is equivalent to 1.3% of earnings (before depreciation and 
amortization), or 0.18% of sales. This is in line with donations numbers from the CECP (2014c), which 
reports a median total charitable donations of $18 million or 0.13% of sales for the firms participating 
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 Consistent with prior research, firms with a dual class equity structure are excluded from our regressions, since the 
holding of superior voting rights could form a prevailing entrenchment mechanism that makes the other provisions listed 
above relatively irrelevant (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
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in its global survey. Charitable contributions made in cash comprise 0.11% of sales in the sample, 
compared to 0.24% of sales that are donated as in-kind assets. It should be noted that data on the specific 
form of donations are available for only a subset of the firms reporting total charitable donations. 
Political donations are smaller at $294,000 per year or 0.003% of sales, but almost one third of firms 
that make donations do so (also) to political parties. These numbers are largely consistent with those 
presented in previous studies, for example, Hill et al. (2013) show that 15% of firms are engaged in 
lobbying or political donations, and donated $152,000 in 2004, augmenting to $334,000 in 2011. About 
42% of firms in our global sample operate a corporate foundation for their donations.  
The average sample firm has a Tobin’s Q of 1.6, ROA of 7%, sales growth of almost 9.4%, a leverage 
ratio of 18.6%, total assets of almost $63 billion, capital expenditures of 5.8% of total assets, and is 52 
years old. Moreover, the average firm has a largest shareholder owning 25.2% of the equity, is most 
frequently held by another company (as ultimate shareholder). The control wedge is negative (-0.6), 
implying that the cash flow rights are significantly less than the voting rights. A staggered board is 
present in virtually all companies and the poison pill the least common anti-takeover mechanism (only 
present in 18.8% of the companies). The average board consists of 11 executive and non-executive 
directors and in 36% of firms the role of CEO and chairman is fulfilled by one person. Almost 11% of 
firms have dual class shares.  
Table 2 presents the country distribution of the total donations and its constituents. Of the western 
economies, Denmark, Canada, Switzerland, and US firms appear to be much more engaged in total 
corporate giving, their donations (as a % of sales) are more than twice the average the U.K., France, and 
Germany. Political donations are particularly concentrated in the U.S. and Brazil. In terms of the industry 
distribution of total corporate donations, we find that the most generous industries in are the human 
health and social work industry, which includes the pharmaceutical sector, and the arts, entertainment, 
and recreation sector.14 The construction, transportation and storage, and professional, scientific and 
technical services industries are the lowest donators. As could be expected, industries that are most 
dependent on political decisions and government contracts make most political donations: the 
electricity/gas, construction, financial, mining, and transportation sectors. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
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 Table available upon request. 
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4.4 Methodology 
Our two basic models, where i refers to the firm and t to years, are: 
		
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		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Donations variables stand for (i) total charitable donations, (ii) cash giving, (iii) in-kind 
contributions, or (iv) political contributions, all scaled by sales, and (v) a dummy variable capturing 
whether or not the firm donates via its corporate foundation. We represent corporate financial 
value/performance by: (i) Tobin’s Q, (ii) ROA, and (iii) yearly sales growth. The findings with 
dependent variables scaled by assets (rather than sales), and with alternative value and performance 
variables will be discussed in the robustness section. Firm characteristics comprise leverage, firm age, 
size, capital expenditures, and R&D expenses. GDP (per capita) stands for the country’s general level 
of welfare. Given that donation patterns vary by industry and over time, we also include these fixed 
effects.  
The various dependent variables require different econometric approaches. When financial 
performance is the dependent variable, we use panel data regressions with cluster-robust standard errors 
(and the above-mentioned fixed effects). When donations (the ratio of total, cash, in-kind, or political 
donations over sales), which are truncated at zero, are used as dependent variable, we use tobit panel 
regression that address the lower limit censoring at zero and cluster standard errors at the firm level. The 
analysis of whether or not the firm operates a foundation is performed by means of logit models of which 
we report the marginal effects. 
To test the first three hypotheses on donations, firm value and corporate governance, we include 
sets of corporate governance variables and legal investor protection variables. The former set comprises 
internal corporate governance variables such as the presence of a staggered board, majority 
requirements, shareholders’ limitations in M&A decision-making, golden parachutes, poison pills, 
chairman-CEO duality, as well as a managerial entrenchment index (E-index, constructed following the 
composition of the original E-index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009)), board size, and the number of 
anti-takeover measures.15 The governance variable set also comprises external corporate governance as 
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 Note that the first five individual anti-takeover dummies constitute the entrenchment index such that they cannot be 
simultaneously included in model. Similarly, we avoid multicollinearity by not including the entrenchment index and the 
number of anti-takeover measures in the same model. 
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captured by the percentage of equity held by the largest shareholder, total ownership concentration, the 
control wedge of the largest shareholder, and dummy variables capturing the main types of ultimate 
owners (manufacturing companies, financial institutional, individuals and families, and the state). Our 
regulation variable is the anti-director rights variable (ADRI) that reflects the managerial 
discretion/entrenchment relative to the shareholders or, in other words, reflects the degree of shareholder 
protection.  
To estimate the fourth hypothesis (on donations and firm value), we regress the donation 
variables on measures of firm profitability. As this relation between donations and firm value could 
suffer from endogeneity, we resort to an instrumental variable approach using 2SLS estimation. A valid 
instrument should not be related to firm performance value through channels other than donations, which 
implies that most company-specific characteristics do not qualify. As instruments, we therefore use peer 
firms’ donations: the average ratios of total, cash, in-kind, and political donations of the peer companies 
by country and by year. The rationale is that a firm’s donations may be affected by the level of donations 
by the direct industry peers, usually due to peer pressure and public perception, but that these donations 
of industry peers do not significantly affect the focal firm’s financial performance. Prior research does 
indeed confirm that firms in the same industry tend to adopt similar giving practices (Brown et al., 2006), 
and corporate behavior in general is strongly influenced by peers (e.g., Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Leary 
& Roberts, 2014; Hoberg, Phillips, & Prabhala, 2014; Foucault & Fresard, 2014). Using peer firms’ 
policies as IVs for focal firms’ policies has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Ferrell, Liang, & 
Renneboog, 2016; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011, 2012). 
First stage:  
		
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To test Hypothesis 5 (measuring the effect of political donations on firm value in election years), 
we apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology to political donations in United Kingdom. This 
approach assumes that in absence of a so-called treatment, the trends in firm value would be similar for 
all firms, but an exogenous shock induces a deviation from this common trend for the ‘treated’ firms 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Our shock is the general elections in the UK of 2010. This natural experiment 
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is largely exogenous, because these elections were simply held as the fixed term of five years for 
parliamentary sessions had ended. In order to identify a trend, firms with missing observations in any of 
the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 are excluded, since at least three consecutive periods (and preferably 
more) are required according to Angrist & Pischke (2009). Although the election result may affect the 
value of all firms, it is most likely to affect the value of companies that have made more political 
donations. Companies’ donations usually peak before the elections and this effort may be visible in firm 
value as a one-off effect or a lasting one (for several years), which is why we test the hypothesis with a 
dummy variable for 2010 and with a post-2010 dummy (that equals 1 if the year is 2010 or any 
subsequent year until 2014, the end of our sample). Our estimated coefficient of interest is the interaction 
term between the time dummy and political donations (treatment), which is expected to be significantly 
positively related to firm value if political donations were to have a positive effect on firm value.  
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V. Results 
5.1. Charitable donations and managerial discretion  
We first examine what types of firms make charitable donations, in cash and in kind. Are these the 
firms in which management has a lot of discretion on corporate decision making, in other words where 
management is more entrenched? If this is indeed the case and if charitable donations are not related to 
firm value, then it is likely that donations may be an agency problem from the perspective of 
shareholders. We first turn to testing Hypothesis 1 in Table 3 where we relate total charitable donations 
to various measures of managerial entrenchment, proxied by a set of indicators measuring the lack of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms (the presence of a staggered board, (super)majority 
requirements to change the acts of incorporation and bylaws, limitations on shareholder influence on 
takeover decisions, a golden parachute, and a poison pill). All models are estimated using Tobit 
regressions. Model 1 shows that none of these managerial entrenchment mechanisms statistically affect 
total charitable donations with exception of the presence of a golden parachute (but this is only weakly 
statistically significant at the 10%). Aggregating these internal governance mechanisms into an E-index 
confirms that managerial entrenchment has no impact on charitable donations (Model 2). A related 
measure is the number of anti-takeover devices as many anti-takeover devices shield management from 
shareholder involvement in decision making on asset restructuring, but this dummy variable capturing 
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that a firm has more than 2 anti-takeover mechanisms in place is again not related to charitable donations 
(Model 4). Models 3 and 5 point test the impact of board size and CEO-chairman duality and find no 
relation either. When we combine as many of these managerial entrenchment variables in one model, 
while avoiding multicollinearity, we can confirm that there is little relation with donations (with 
exception of the weak relation with golden parachutes and larger boards, which may still proxy for firm 
size). So, these findings are not in line with an agency view on corporate donations and hence fail to 
support Hypothesis 1. The Tobit regressions of Table 3 also point out that larger firms and those spending 
more on R&D are more prone to do corporate philanthropy. The positive sign of the coefficient on R&D 
expenditures is in line with the literature and suggests that charitable donations may be consistent with 
value maximizing behavior (Brown et al., 2006). In unreported regressions, we dissect total charitable 
donations into cash and in-kind donations, we find very similar results in that there is no indication that 
agency problems-riddled firms are doing more donations.  
In Table 4, we examine the determinants of distributing charitable donations by means of a corporate 
foundation. Model 2 shows that high managerial entrenchment (a high E-index) is positively related to 
giving through a corporate foundation. Models 1 and 6 indicate that shareholder limitations on takeover 
decisions and golden parachutes drive this result. Models 4 and 5 confirm that firms in which agency 
problems may be an issue, proxied by CEO-chairman duality (whereby the CEO can wield more power 
given that he is also chairman of the board of directors whose task it is to monitory the executive) and a 
high number of anti-takeover devices which induces immunity to takeover attempts, are more likely to 
use a foundation. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 in the sense that firms that are more 
prone to agency costs use a corporate foundation. Alternatively, the results are also consistent with the 
notion that the use of a foundation may be a way to address the issue of agency problems as the 
foundation structure puts the corporation management to some extent at arm’s-length (although there is 
in most cases still some degree of control by the corporation), makes it easier to maintain stable levels 
of donation pay-outs to charity, and avoids corporate timing of contributions to the foundation with 
respect to business cycle and tax purposes. We will perform further analyses below to investigate which 
hypotheses receive empirical support. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
5.2. Charitable donations and shareholder control  
Our second hypothesis concerns the impact of external corporate governance (shareholder influence) 
on charitable corporate donations and the use of a corporate foundation. If donations reflect an agency 
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problem, we would expect that strong shareholder control would limit corporate philanthropy. Table 5 
shows no support for Hypothesis 2 as none of variables capturing shareholder power (the ownership 
stake of the largest shareholder, whether or not the ownership is concentrated or dispersed, the control 
wedge which measures deviations from voting and cash flow rights, the presence of a largest shareholder 
of a specific type such as a corporation, individual or family, financial institution, the state) are correlated 
with corporate donations. We find that larger, profitable, and relatively younger companies with high 
R&D expenditures are giving more money to charity but this is not curbed by shareholders. When we 
examine the subsamples of cash and in-kind donations, we also do not find a strong relation between 
potential shareholder monitoring and donations.16  
When we turn to corporation foundations, we find that the likelihood that a company donates funds 
via a foundation is much lower for companies with strong external governance. The logit analysis of 
Table 6 demonstrates that the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, a proxy for 
shareholder monitoring, is negatively related to a corporate foundation. For every 10% ownership by the 
largest shareholder, the probability that the firm donates via a foundation decreases with 4%. Also, the 
control wedge of the largest shareholder, reflecting the monitoring incentives for a given level of voting 
rights, is negatively related to a corporate foundation. This potentially indicates that monitoring by large 
shareholders reduces the need to a corporate foundation. Moreover, both proxies of state ownership are 
negatively associated with the likelihood of a foundation. This could be related to the fact that firms in 
which the state holds an important stake make fewer political donations, possibly because state-owned 
firms may be able to cater to expectations of stakeholders (society at large, customers, supplies) in 
different ways such as through their operational activities.  
So far, we have documented that the managerial entrenchment does not lead to more corporate 
donations, nor do donations decrease in firms with strong shareholders. In firms with strong monitoring 
owners, there is less need to resort to corporate foundations to distribute corporate donations. 
 [Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
 
5.3. Political donations 
We turn to the relation between political donations, managerial entrenchment and shareholder 
power. A positive relation between managerial discretion in decision making and a negative one with 
shareholder equity ownership concentration would suggest that political donations are beneficial for 
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 Tables available upon request.  
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managers but do not create net value for shareholders (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Table 7 presents some (but 
not strong) evidence of agency problems of political donations as managerial entrenchment is positively 
correlated with political donations: we report a positive significant parameter estimate for the presence 
of a poison pill, CEO-chairman duality, and strong anti-takeover devices – all of which strengthen the 
power of management relative to that of shareholders. For instance, firms with a poison pill in place 
make on average political donations that are 3.2% higher. Shareholder voting power is not significantly 
related political donations in Table 8. Interestingly, the only exception is the negative relation with 
government equity holdings in the firm. This is not unexpected as it is less critical for firms with share 
blocks held by the government to build up a relationship with political parties by means of political 
donations; presumably because there are more efficient ways to improve or maintain their relation with 
the government or political parties who may be represented on the firm’s board (Wang & Qian, 2011).  
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
 
5.4 Corporate philanthropy and investor protection  
Our third hypothesis states that more charitable donations in firms with weak shareholder voting 
power and weak shareholder rights (which implies a relatively more entrenched management) is 
congruent with donations being an agency problem. If donations are mainly benefitting management to 
the detriment of shareholders, one would expect shareholders who are strong because of ownership 
concentration and regulation to curb corporate philanthropy. Legal investor protection against 
management is represented by the anti-director rights index (ADRI). In Table 9, we find that the ADRI 
is negatively associated with total charitable donations, political donations, and donating via a corporate 
foundation. For charitable cash and in-kind donations the results are insignificant, which could be 
because the number of observations on these forms of donations is smaller and stems from a few of 
countries, which leads to little variation in the values of the ADRI and therefore reduces statistical power 
(not tabulated). We also observe that when the largest shareholder owns a large share block, there are 
fewer charitable and political donations (but has not effect on working with a foundation). This also 
points at donations being an agency problem because shareholder power by law or by voting rights 
reduces corporate giving, and is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 3. The interaction term 
between the ADRI and ownership of the largest shareholder is positive for total charitable donations 
(Model 2) and political donations (Model 4). This may imply that shareholder influence by regulation 
(shareholder protection) and by voting power (largest shareholder) are substitutes, and that investor legal 
rights are mainly important in the absence of a large shareholder that is monitoring management. The 
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other way around, this finding could also imply that strong legal investor rights substitute the need for a 
large shareholder that monitors the giving. Indeed, La Porta et al. (1998) show that greater investor 
protection is associated with lower ownership concentration. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
5.5 Charitable donations and firm value 
We examine the relation between corporate philanthropy and firm value by means of three measures 
of corporate finance performance: Tobin’s Q, a market-based value and hence our main measure, and 
two operational variables (ROA and sales growth). In order to address endogenous concerns regarding 
donations and firm value/performance, we implement an instrumental variable approach with 2SLS 
estimation. As mentioned above, the instrumental variable is the average amount of total charitable 
donations made by firms in the same industry and country in a given year. The first column of Table 10 
and the following tables shows the first stage regression in which the actual total charitable donations 
are regressed on the instrumental variable and control variables in order to obtain a predicted value. In 
the second stage, we relate the predicted variables of donations to firm value. A negative or insignificant 
relation in the second stage regression would be consistent with agency theory whereas the alternative 
hypothesis predicts a positive relation and would be consistent with the value-enhancement theory.  
Our instrument is significantly positively related to actual total charitable donations (Model 1 of 
Table 11) and in the second stage we find that total charitable donations are strongly positively related 
to (current and future) Tobin’s Q. Total charitable donations are also positively related with current 
ROA, and to future sales growth. These results are also economically significant, as a 10% increase in 
the ratio total charitable donations on sales is associated with an increase of 0.11 in Tobin’s Q ratio, of 
0.12% in ROA and 0.1% in future sales growth. Our results further support Hypothesis 4 that total 
charitable donations enhance firm value. When we turn to the 2SLS instrumental variable results for the 
subsample of in-kind donations, we also find a positive and significant relation with future Tobin’s Q, 
ROA and sales growth (Table 11). Given that our marked-based value is forward looking, it seems odd 
that only the future value of Q is affect. This is consistent with the notion that donations in kind may be 
less value enhancing because they are not perfect substitutes for individual donations. It may also be that 
it takes some time before the market incorporates in-kind assets donated to charity as investors may not 
immediately aware of these contributions, e.g. due to delayed reporting in annual/sustainability reports. 
It also seems to take some time before in-kind donations actually improve corporate financial 
performance (as reflected in future ROA and future sales growth).  
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In Table 12, the results for cash charitable donation show stronger results: both current and future 
Tobin’s Q are positively affected by cash donations as are ROA and future sales growth. Again, we find 
strong support for the value-enhancement hypothesis. While charitable donations in cash and in-kind 
assets are both positively related to firm value, this relation is stronger and more significant for cash 
donations. The reason could be that cash donations function as a better substitute for individual donations 
since they help solve the collective action problem. They may also serve as a signaling mechanism of 
future corporate performance because of their transparency and salience, as proposed by Shapira (2012). 
Moreover, the fact that cash donations can be transferred via a corporate foundation, which facilitates a 
fair and objective decision making process, could also contribute to cash donations being perceived as a 
more genuine altruistic gesture.  
We also study the interaction of the type of charitable donations with using a corporate 
foundation to donate and its effect on firm value and performance. However, the exact amount of 
donations transferred via a foundation is not available, which is a major limitation to this proxy. In-kind 
donations on only rarely made by means of a corporate foundation. We find that cash donations enhance 
firm value, mainly when distributed via a foundation (not tabulated). Of course, we acknowledge that 
peer firms’ donations may not be a perfect IV, especially if lobbying activities are prominent, and there 
may be a “reflection problem” (Manski, 1993). Nevertheless, the consistency between OLS results and 
2SLS results are supportive to the value-enhancement view rather than to the agency view. 
[Insert about here Tables 10-12] 
 
5.6 Political donations and firm value 
In Table 13, when we use the same 2SLS estimation for political donations, we fail to find any 
significant correlations with firm value, which is consistent with the agency explanation of political 
donations. Therefore, financing politics does not seem to pay off in general. We turn to a difference-in-
differences analysis of political donations on Tobin’s Q in order to examine whether the political 
donations lead to a change in value (Tobin’s Q) in the year of the election (the 2010 UK general election 
in our setting) and the subsequent period. The main variables of interest are the interaction terms, which 
depict a change in the trend in firm value for firms with high political donations compared to other firms. 
The insignificant interaction terms of political donations, as shown in Table 14, reveal that political 
donations do not affect firm value in election years and beyond, which does not support Hypothesis 5. 
One possible reason for the lack of relation between political donations and firm value in the UK may 
be that most political donations had gone to the Labour party, which had been in power for more than a 
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decade and lost the elections in 2010. Unfortunately, the data do not enable us to partition the political 
donations by political party or politician. However, evidence on the US elections from 1979 to 2004 
points out that firms with high political contributions experience positive stock returns as a result of 
elections, even when this leads to a change in power (Cooper et al., 2010). Another reason why we do 
not find a relation could be the increased political uncertainty induced by a change in power as no party 
obtained an absolute majority (which has been very rare in the UK). Still, quickly after the election, it 
became clear that the Conservatives could and wanted to form a coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats, which attenuated uncertainty. Another reason for the non-relation could be that firms thrive 
better under a Labour government, but this may not be a plausible explanation because the Conservatives 
are generally regarded as more business friendly, which was reflected in an FTSE 100 surge by 2.3% on 
the day of the elections.   
 [Insert about here Tables 13 and 14] 
 
5.7 Robustness tests and alternative explanations 
We conducted some robustness checks. First, we repeated our analysis with the market-to-book 
value, the return on equity (ROE), and the five-yearly sales growth. The results for market-to-book value 
and ROE were similar to those for Tobin’s Q and ROA, respectively, whereas the five yearly sales 
growth did not yield any relation and appeared to be in inappropriate measure. Second, we also studied 
whether the results on donations depended on the scaling (by sales) and now used (a) total assets and (b) 
cash holdings as the denominator in the donations ratios. Most results appeared robust to scaling. Third, 
we also performed robustness checks on various control variables; e.g. for firm age, we also used the 
year of the foundation and the year of incorporation; for firm size, we used the number of employees; 
and instead of accounting performance, we included free cash flows. Our conclusions are upheld. Fourth, 
we also find that the outcomes are robust to the effect of potential outliers, based on tests with 
winsorizing at the 5% and 95% levels, instead of 1% and 99%. 
An alternative explanation of our results may be a “cover-up” story, which is consistent with the 
agency argument. That is, high donation companies may be inherently malicious, in that they are actually 
the most irresponsible companies and intend to cover-up their malign nature by giving more to charities. 
If responsible conduct is value-diminishing, there will be a positive relation between firm value of 
corporate donations, not because corporate donations are value enhancing but because the most 
irresponsible companies give the most and they also create highest shareholder value by not adopting a 
policy of corporate social responsibility. A simply sanity check on the correlations between our 
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donations data and the corporate CSR ratings that we obtain from ASSET4 rejects this alternative 
explanation: all correlations are positive and highly significant. The correlations of overall donations 
with the overall CSR rating, the environmental rating, and the social rating are about 13%, 15%, and 
13%, respectively. This indicates that high donation companies are also more socially responsible, and 
is inconsistent with a “cover-up” hypothesis. 
 
VI.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine whether corporate donations are the result of agency problems or are 
consistent with value-enhancement. In doing so, we distinguish between total charitable donations 
(which comprise cash and in-kind giving) and political donations. To mitigate potential endogeneity 
concerns, we employ an instrumental variable approach with peer-based IVs and also conduct a 
difference-in-difference analysis on political donations around the 2010 UK election. Our results show 
that corporate donations are very unlikely to be agency problems: when management has a lot of 
discretion (because they are entrenched due to the lack of internal governance mechanisms, regulation 
or monitoring), they do not make more charitable donations. Likewise, strong external governance by 
powerful shareholders does not lead to lower charitable donations, though investor protection by law at 
the country level is negatively correlated with donations. Charitable donations are positively related to 
measures of current and future firm value (Tobin’s Q) and firm performance (ROA and sales growth). 
These positive relations are consistent for charitable donations made in cash and in-kind assets, but are 
stronger for the former type of donation. 
In addition, we also study the role of corporate foundations in channeling donations to the 
beneficiaries. A corporate foundation is used by firms which suffer from agency problems, that is, it is 
associated with poor internal governance, reflected by the presence of an M&A limitation, a golden 
parachute, a larger board size, anti-takeover devices, CEO-chairman duality, and a higher E-index value. 
Moreover, corporate foundations are also more common in firms with poor external corporate 
governance, specifically in the absence of a powerful shareholder and monitoring incentives. The choice 
of corporate giving via a corporate foundation may actually be the solution to the aspects of poor 
governance. This is confirmed by the fact that using a foundation is related to higher firm value (as 
reflected by Tobin’s Q and ROA). This implies that a foundation helps to ensure that donations are spent 
in the best interest of the firm, which is most critical in case the firm suffers from severe agency 
problems. 
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Moreover, political donations do not contribute to shareholder wealth and are positively correlated 
with indicators of poor internal corporate governance and managerial entrenchment (namely the poison 
pill, CEO-chairman duality, and anti-takeover devices). This is consistent with further tests showing that 
political donations do not enhance Tobin’s Q, and are unrelated to any measure of firm profitability. 
Moreover, a difference-in-difference approach applied to the 2010 UK elections unveils a non-
significant effect of political donations on firm value for companies characterized by high political 
donations. 
Overall, our findings may imply that policymakers and firms should focus on donations to charity, 
preferably in cash and by means of a corporate foundation in order improve the effectiveness of its 
giving, in particular when they have little power to control managers. All in all, doing well by doing 
good seems possible. Of course, our research suffers from some limitations induced by data availability: 
first, while we know whether or not the firm donates by means of a corporate foundation, the firm could 
still combine a direct giving programme with donations via its corporate foundation, and we do not have 
information on this split of the donations. Second, in-kind donations could not be differentiated by asset 
category (donations of products in stock, research executive on behalf of a specific beneficiary, share 
donations, etc.). As pointed out above, we do not know the recipient political parties or politicians of the 
political donations, which would enable us to differentiate between contributions to winning and losing 
parties and measure the potential surprise effect of unexpected election results. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to compare how charitable donations made to specific charitable organizations impact firm 
value. Furthermore, the exact announcement date of donations would be very useful data, because it 
would enable us to perform direct tests by means of an event study approach on how financial markets 
reacts to philanthropic news.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max. 
Corporate philanthropy variables        
Total charitable donations/sales (w.) 11,205 1.792 0.559 4.231 0 31.968 
In-kind charitable donations/sales (w.) 1,572 2.414 0.261 7.293 0 50.785 
Cash charitable donations/sales (w.) 2,389 1.060 0.530 1.623 0 10.708 
Political donations/sales (w.) 3,754 0.011 0 0.042 0 0.317 
Company foundation 11,831 0.418 0 0.493 0 1 
       
Financial performance variables       
Tobin’s Q (w.) 11,566 1.614 1.276 0.973 0.665 6.868 
ROA (%,) (w.) 11,609 7.026 5.910 7.537 -19.130 36.890 
Sales growth (annual) 11,319 0.094 0.068 0.221 -0.486 1.047 
       
Internal governance variables       
Staggered board  10,914 0.989 1 0.106 0 1 
Majority requirement 8,106 0.645 1 0.479 0 1 
M&A limitation 4,455 0.284 0 0.451 0 1 
Golden parachute 7,398 0.457 0 0.498 0 1 
Poison pill 3,761 0.188 0 0.391 0 1 
E-index 3,247 1.942 2 1.111 0 5 
Board size 11,817 11.016 11 3.682 1 45 
CEO-chair duality 11,831 0.363 0 0.481 0 1 
Anti-takeover devices 6,573 3.017 2 2.097 1 12 
Dual class shares 11,831 0.107 0 0.309 0 1 
       
External governance variables       
Largest shareholder (%) 10,456 25.181 15.045 21.550 0 100 
Ownership concentration 9,997 0.682 0 1.072 0 3 
Control wedge 9,411 -0.599 0 4.009 -32.020 4.530 
Government holdings 11,588 0.024 0 0.109 0 0.990 
Ultimate owner is corporation 10,973 0.588 1 0.492 0 1 
Ultimate owner is finance institution 10,973 0.221 0 0.415 0 1 
Ultimate owner is individual or family 10,973 0.109 0 0.312 0 1 
Ultimate owner is state 10,973 0.081 0 0.273 0 1 
       
Firm level variables       
Leverage 11,795 0.186 0.165 0.153 0 1.456 
Age 10,783 52.703 34 45.066 2 362 
Size (billion) 11,798 63.283 9.054 234.601 0.018 4766.626 
Capital expenditures/total assets (w.) 11,100 5.894 4.24 6.105 0.010 42.530 
R&D expenditures/sales (w.) 11,827 0.053 0 0.036 0 0.210 
       
Country level variables       
ADRI 11,447 3.659 4 1.004 2 5 
GDP (ln billion) 11,831 10.310 10.621 0.828 6.950 11.642 
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TABLE 2 
Country distribution of corporate donations 
This table shows the different types of donations as a % of sales by country. ADRI stands for the anti-directors 
rights index. The definitions are given in Appendix A.  
Country General 
Total charitable 
donations 
(% of sales) 
Cash charitable 
donations 
(% of sales) 
In-kind 
charitable 
donations 
(% of sales) 
Political 
donations 
(% of sales) 
 
Obs. ADRI Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Australia 447 4 418 0.220 111 0.088 69 0.055 143 0.001 
Austria 17 4 11 0.050 1 0.174 1 0.028 9 0.001 
Belgium 86 2 81 0.063 31 0.030 9 0.077 3 0.001 
Brazil 262 5 261 0.404 10 0.176 7 0.069 37 0.008 
Canada 557 4 516 0.291 82 0.126 55 0.168 110 0.001 
Chile 44 5 44 0.068 3 0.090 0 0.000 1 0.001 
Colombia 42 4 42 0.224 6 0.057 5 0.033 4 0.001 
Denmark 42 4 41 0.305 7 0.1.75 0 n.a. 2 0.001 
Egypt 10 4 10 0.224 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 
Finland 94 4 86 0.023 23 0.021 3 0.011 24 0.001 
France 257 5 243 0.115 49 0.059 47 0.126 13 0.001 
Germany 211 4 195 0.081 35 0.101 7 0.062 58 0.001 
Greece 91 3 91 0.200 15 0.310 4 0.132 10 0.001 
Hong Kong 779 4 775 0.127 53 0.078 17 0.016 9 0.001 
India 274 4 271 0.125 11 0.029 3 0.025 49 0.003 
Ireland 48 4 28 0.038 6 0.038 0 n.a. 40 0.001 
Israel 45 3 44 0.099 9 0.070 10 0.030 6 0.001 
Italy 239 2 233 0.124 40 0.068 28 0.017 31 0.002 
Japan 488 5 466 0.064 108 0.067 43 0.033 2 0.001 
Jordan 6 2 6 0.865 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 
Malaysia 64 4 62 0.195 11 0.032 4 0.119 4 0.001 
Mexico 68 2 67 0.173 3 0.012 3 0.081 8 0.001 
Netherlands 151 4 131 0.057 29 0.043 18 0.033 27 0.001 
New Zealand 82 5 82 0.040 7 0.015 2 0.000 17 0.001 
Nigeria 3 3 3 0.155 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 
Norway 48 4 45 0.052 3 0.015 1 0.000 8 0.001 
Peru 4 4 4 0.060 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 
Philippines 45 4 45 0.299 2 0.319 0 n.a. 6 0.001 
Portugal 72 3 71 0.098 22 0.090 20 0.013 8 0.001 
Singapore 94 4 87 0.117 12 0.013 1 0.001 4 0.001 
South Africa 308 4 302 0.246 26 0.171 25 0.228 89 0.001 
South Korea 355 4 351 0.256 19 0.098 6 0.004 29 0.001 
Spain 256 5 238 0.164 52 0.109 52 0.054 67 0.002 
Sweden 83 4 81 0.087 27 0.091 6 0.055 13 0.001 
Switzerland 127 3 113 0.297 22 0.084 17 0.148 38 0.001 
Taiwan 421 5 417 0.073 29 0.032 21 0.133 28 0.001 
Thailand 42 3 42 0.153 7 0.051 3 0.021 3 0.001 
Turkey 80 4 79 0.221 7 0.044 5 0.007 5 0.001 
UK 2,837 4 2,647 0.128 684 0.093 422 0.177 2,192 0.001 
USA 2,268 2 2,098 0.254 801 0.141 642 0.370 614 0.003 
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TABLE 3 
Total charitable donations and internal corporate governance  
The dependent variable is total charitable donations scaled by sales and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are 
based on a tobit regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust and clustered at the firm 
level. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on 
two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
              
Staggered board 0.714 
    
0.758 
 
(0.542) 
    
(0.558) 
Majority requirement -0.276 
    
-0.234 
 
(0.503) 
    
(0.495) 
M&A limitation 0.249 
    
0.167 
 
(0.975) 
    
(0.966) 
Golden parachute 0.668* 
    
0.694* 
 
(0.372) 
    
(0.379) 
Poison pill 0.327 
    
0.346 
 
(0.607) 
    
(0.638) 
E-index 
 
0.233 
    
  
(0.228) 
    
Board size 
  
0.137 
  
1.401** 
   
(0.299) 
  
(0.704) 
Anti-takeover devices 
   
0.055 
  
    
(0.164) 
  
CEO-chairman duality 
    
0.188 -0.260 
     
(0.240) (0.571) 
Tobin’s Q 0.501 0.522 0.225 0.195 0.220 0.495 
 
(0.338) (0.339) (0.150) (0.211) (0.148) (0.343) 
Leverage -0.028 0.004 -0.534 -0.573 -0.518 -0.014 
 
(0.848) (0.851) (0.544) (0.717) (0.544) (0.842) 
Age -0.311 -0.299 -0.315** -0.270 -0.323** -0.327 
 
(0.212) (0.210) (0.141) (0.168) (0.137) (0.212) 
Size 0.509*** 0.530*** 0.332*** 0.291*** 0.335*** 0.394*** 
 
(0.140) (0.142) (0.085) (0.105) (0.089) (0.136) 
Capital expenditures 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.094** 0.037 0.039 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.028) (0.047) (0.028) (0.041) 
R&D expenditures 0.474*** 0.483*** 0.304*** 0.317*** 0.302*** 0.481*** 
 
(0.130) (0.132) (0.083) (0.094) (0.083) (0.131) 
R&D indicator -1.662** -1.681** -1.115*** -1.065*** -1.119*** -1.621* 
 
(0.842) (0.842) (0.300) (0.382) (0.300) (0.839) 
ROA  0.029 0.028 0.055*** 0.040 0.055*** 0.030 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.046) 
Constant -8.827 -10.834 -4.176** -3.529 -3.876** -10.204 
 
(6.474) (6.885) (1.691) (3.049) (1.640) (6.656) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,584 1,584 6,227 3,710 6,230 1,582 
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TABLE 4 
Corporate philanthropy via a corporate charitable foundation and internal corporate governance 
The dependent variable is a dummy whether the firm maintains a corporate foundation. Coefficients represent the marginal 
effect of a logit estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. ***, 
**, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
              
Staggered board 0.018 
    
0.013 
 
(0.117) 
    
(0.084) 
Majority requirement 0.024 
    
0.018 
 
(0.020) 
    
(0.019) 
M&A limitation 0.094** 
    
0.079* 
 
(0.047) 
    
(0.041) 
Golden parachute 0.094*** 
    
0.071*** 
 
(0.027) 
    
(0.025) 
Poison pill 0.027 
    
0.012 
 
(0.026) 
    
(0.026) 
E-index 
 
0.047*** 
    
  
(0.013) 
    
Board size 
  
0.083** 
  
0.052 
   
(0.041) 
  
(0.044) 
Anti-takeover devices 
   
0.065*** 
  
    
(0.017) 
  
CEO-chairman duality 
    
0.101*** 0.096*** 
     
(0.021) (0.021) 
ROA -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q 0.030** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.052*** 0.030** 0.024** 
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Leverage -0.043 -0.048 -0.029 -0.019 -0.004 -0.047 
 
(0.076) (0.084) (0.083) (0.077) (0.076) (0.065) 
Age 0.012 0.022* 0.034 -0.001 0.027 0.001 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.027) (0.020) (0.023) (0.015) 
Size 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Capital expenditures -0.003 -0.004** -0.003* -0.001 -0.003* -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D expenditures 0.381 0.408* 1.478*** 0.885** 1.267** 0.258 
 
(0.293) (0.245) (0.559) (0.441) (0.498) (0.266) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,648 1,648 6,505 3,879 6,508 1,647 
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TABLE 5 
Total charitable donations and external corporate governance  
 
The dependent variable is total charitable donations scaled by sales and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are 
from a tobit regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the firm level. Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables  
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
             
Largest shareholder  0.007 
    
 
 (0.005) 
    
Ownership concentration  
 
0.086 
   
 
 
 
(0.105) 
   
Control wedge  
  
0.084 
  
 
 
  
(0.081) 
  
Government holdings  
   
1.455 
 
 
 
   
(0.954) 
 
Institutional owner  
    
0.035 
 
 
    
(0.243) 
Individual/family owner  
    
0.359 
 
 
    
(0.323) 
State owner  
    
0.333 
 
 
    
(0.395) 
ROA  0.057*** 0.055** 0.065*** 0.052** 0.051** 
 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Tobin’s Q  0.201 0.247 0.149 0.237 0.286* 
 
 (0.155) (0.161) (0.169) (0.150) (0.158) 
Leverage  -0.334 -0.645 -0.369 -0.457 -0.603 
 
 (0.537) (0.590) (0.560) (0.546) (0.561) 
Age  -0.281* -0.345** -0.298** -0.325** -0.331** 
 
 (0.145) (0.156) (0.141) (0.140) (0.146) 
Size  0.329*** 0.337*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.341*** 
 
 (0.089) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087) (0.090) 
Capital expenditures  0.020 0.044 0.029 0.037 0.035 
 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) 
R&D expenditures  0.305*** 0.295*** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.315*** 
 
 (0.083) (0.079) (0.086) (0.083) (0.085) 
Constant  -3.796** -3.868** -3.431* -4.166** -3.859** 
 
 (1.682) (1.726) (1.795) (1.650) (1.785) 
Industry and year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5,651 5,600 5,169 6,200 5,893 
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TABLE 6 
Corporate philanthropy via a corporate charitable foundation and external corporate 
governance  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy whether the firm maintains a corporate foundation. Coefficients represent the 
marginal effects of a logit estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are presented 
in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables  
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
             
Largest shareholder  -0.004*** 
    
 
 (0.001) 
    
Ownership concentration  
 
-0.025 
   
 
 
 
(0.015) 
   
Control wedge  
  
-0.012*** 
  
 
 
  
(0.005) 
  
Government holdings  
   
-0.198** 
 
 
 
   
(0.094) 
 
Institutional owner  
    
0.014 
 
 
    
(0.036) 
Individual/family owner  
    
-0.017 
 
 
    
(0.042) 
State owner  
    
-0.172*** 
 
 
    
(0.044) 
ROA  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q  0.039*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
Leverage  0.019 0.019 0.000 -0.006 0.014 
 
 (0.088) (0.091) (0.096) (0.075) (0.076) 
Age  0.022 0.012 0.020 0.026 0.009 
 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
Size  0.142*** 0.166*** 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 
 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capital expenditures  -0.002 -0.003 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D expenditures  1.250** 1.718*** 1.301** 1.279*** 1.127** 
 
 (0.493) (0.542) (0.557) (0.385) (0.438) 
Industry and year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5,904 5,853 5,405 6,478 6,165 
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TABLE 7 
Political donations and internal corporate governance  
The dependent variable is political donations scaled by sales and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are based on a tobit 
regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
              
Staggered board -0.079 
    
-0.086 
 
(0.077) 
    
(0.077) 
Majority requirement 0.009 
    
0.010 
 
(0.014) 
    
(0.015) 
M&A limitation -0.005 
    
-0.003 
 
(0.022) 
    
(0.022) 
Golden parachute -0.000 
    
-0.005 
 
(0.015) 
    
(0.015) 
Poison pill 0.035* 
    
0.032* 
 
(0.018) 
    
(0.017) 
E-index 
 
0.009 
    
  
(0.007) 
    
Board size 
  
0.002 
  
-0.001 
   
(0.021) 
  
(0.027) 
CEO-chairman duality 
    
0.046*** 0.022* 
     
(0.011) (0.011) 
Anti-takeover devices 
   
0.020** 
  
    
(0.009) 
  
Tobin’s Q 0.009 0.010 0.012** 0.012** 0.010 0.008 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
Leverage -0.000 0.002 0.033 0.050* 0.041 0.010 
 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.042) 
Age 0.021** 0.020** 0.015** 0.016** 0.012* 0.019** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
Size 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Capital expenditures 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D expenditures 0.003** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -1.181** -1.483*** -0.808*** -0.915*** -0.732*** -1.094** 
 
(0.521) (0.546) (0.149) (0.190) (0.130) (0.538) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 2,606 1,642 2,606 712 
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TABLE 8 
External corporate governance and political donations 
The dependent variable is political donations scaled by sales and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are based on a tobit 
regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
              
Broad governance score 0.001*** 
     
 
(0.000) 
     
Largest shareholder 
 
0.000 
    
  
(0.000) 
    
Ownership concentration 
  
0.008 
   
   
(0.008) 
   
Control wedge 
   
0.009 
  
    
(0.009) 
  
Government holdings 
    
-0.410*** 
 
     
(0.102) 
 
Institutional owner 
     
-0.001 
      
(0.016) 
Individual/family owner 
     
0.017 
      
(0.019) 
State owner 
     
-0.030 
      
(0.033) 
ROA -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q 0.010** 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.011* 0.011* 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.035 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.031 0.040 
 
(0.021) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) 
Age 0.015*** 0.017** 0.014** 0.017** 0.015** 0.016** 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital expenditures 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D expenditures 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.669*** -0.835*** -0.793*** -0.856*** -0.770*** -0.755*** 
 
(0.070) (0.160) (0.150) (0.158) (0.141) (0.140) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,606 2,430 2,313 2,305 2,598 2,507 
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Table 9 
Corporation donations and shareholder protection 
 
This table shows the relation between total charitable and political donations as well the use of a corporate 
foundation, as dependent variables, and anti-director rights and shareholder voting rights as main explanatory 
variables. Models 1-4 are tobit regressions, models 5-6 are logistic regressions (for which marginal effects are 
shown). Robust and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Total 
charitable 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Political 
donations 
Corporate 
foundation 
Corporate 
foundation 
              
ADRI -0.313*** -0.535*** -0.032*** -0.048*** -0.260*** -0.207*** 
 
(0.111) (0.164) (0.006) (0.009) (0.050) (0.045) 
ADRI × Largest 
shareholder 
 
0.013*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
-0.001** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Largest shareholder 
 
-0.042** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
0.009 
  
(0.018) 
 
(0.001) 
 
0.014 
ROA 0.039** 0.043** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q 0.216 0.174 0.006 0.004 0.013** 0.011** 
 
(0.132) (0.140) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.625 -0.491 0.028 0.040 -0.024 -0.017 
 
(0.520) (0.512) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.026) 
Age -0.283** -0.265** 0.015** 0.017** 0.008 0.005 
 
(0.129) (0.135) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Size 0.264*** 0.234*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.079) (0.083) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) 
CapEx 0.048* 0.031 0.002*** 0.002** -0.001* -0.001* 
 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D expenditures 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.125 0.115 
 
(0.078) (0.078) (0.001) (0.001) (0.178) (0.123) 
Constant -1.092 -0.140 -0.391*** -0.333** 
  
 
(1.628) (1.771) (0.132) (0.145) 
  
       
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,698 6,081 2,796 2,606 6,975 6,332 
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TABLE 10 
Total charitable donations and firm value (IV approach) 
The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q, ROA, or yearly sales growth, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are based on a 2SLS 
instrumental variable regression, with the first stage regression reported in the first column. The instrumental variable is the year’s 
average total charitable donations by industry peers in the same country. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
First stage Second stage 
Variables 
Total 
charitable 
donations Tobin's Q 
Future 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Future 
ROA 
Sales 
growth 
Future 
sales 
growth 
                
IV: Total charitable 
donations by local 
industry peers 
0.656*** 
(0.124) 
      
       
Predicted total charitable 
donations 
 
0.048*** 0.023*** 0.152** 0.057 -0.002 0.005** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.063) (0.073) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA 0.004 0.029*** 0.029*** 
  
  
 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Leverage -0.206 -0.021 -0.378*** -6.681*** -0.693 -0.028 -0.010 
 
(0.587) (0.076) (0.077) (0.692) (0.804) (0.020) (0.021) 
Age -0.240* 0.019 -0.016 -0.191 -0.011 -0.020*** -0.010** 
 
(0.125) (0.021) (0.021) (0.176) (0.197) (0.004) (0.004) 
Size 0.034 -0.189*** -0.141*** -0.835*** -1.342*** -0.002 -0.010*** 
 
(0.071) (0.010) (0.009) (0.083) (0.092) (0.002) (0.002) 
Capital expenditures 0.018 0.005*** -0.001 0.159*** -0.009 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D expenditures 0.153*** 0.017*** 0.027*** -0.061 0.010 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.048) (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.045) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.937 5.318*** 4.977*** 30.493*** 39.485*** 0.597*** 0.613*** 
 
(1.538) (0.229) (0.223) (1.917) (2.171) (0.048) (0.051) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,484 6,441 6,389 8,266 6,362 7,971 6,439 
Number of firms 1,548 1,539 1,514 1,867 1,513 1,854 1,525 
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TABLE 11 
In-kind charitable donations and firm value (IV-approach) 
The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q, ROA, or yearly sales growth, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are based on a 2SLS 
instrumental variable regression, with the first stage regression reported in the first column. The instrumental variable is the year’s 
average in-kind charitable donations by industry peers in the same country. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 First stage Second stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 
In-kind 
charitable 
donations Tobin's Q 
Future 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Future 
ROA 
Sales 
growth 
Future sales 
growth 
                
IV: In-kind charitable 
donations by local 
industry peers 
0.552*** 
(0.140) 
      
       
Predicted in-kind 
charitable donations 
 
0.012 0.020** -0.010 0.138* 0.002 0.003* 
  
(0.010) (0.008) (0.078) (0.079) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA -0.058** 0.026*** 0.030*** 
  
  
 
(0.027) (0.003) (0.003) 
    
Leverage -0.203 -0.698*** -0.581*** -10.815*** -3.460 0.018 0.003 
 
(1.830) (0.206) (0.220) (1.863) (2.141) (0.049) (0.048) 
Age -0.393 0.033 0.059 -0.064 0.341 -0.015 -0.019** 
 
(0.346) (0.048) (0.048) (0.400) (0.457) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 0.434 -0.183*** -0.165*** -1.068*** -1.631*** -0.001 -0.012** 
 
(0.303) (0.027) (0.025) (0.224) (0.244) (0.005) (0.005) 
Capital expenditures 0.050 0.008 -0.015*** 0.311*** -0.030 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.046) (0.006) (0.006) (0.054) (0.059) (0.002) (0.001) 
R&D expenditures 0.352*** 0.020** 0.010 -0.013 0.032 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.118) (0.009) (0.009) (0.079) (0.089) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -7.664 5.000*** 5.827*** 20.490*** 34.559*** 0.297* 0.325** 
 
(6.149) (0.763) (0.797) (6.760) (7.687) (0.163) (0.159) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,085 1,079 1,004 1,285 997 1,235 1,009 
Number of firms 333 331 317 405 318 390 320 
  
43 
 
TABLE 12 
Cash charitable donations and firm value (IV approach) 
The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q, ROA, or yearly sales growth, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are based on a 2SLS 
instrumental variable regression, with the first stage regression reported in the first column. The instrumental variable is the year’s average 
cash charitable donations by industry peers in the same country. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 First stage Second stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 
Cash 
charitable 
donations Tobin's Q 
Future 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Future 
ROA 
Sales 
growth 
Future sales 
growth 
                
IV: Cash charitable donations 
by local industry peers 
0.746*** 
(0.134)       
       
Predicted cash charitable 
donations 
 
0.075** 0.061** 1.197*** -0.016 -0.014** 0.016** 
  
(0.032) (0.029) (0.228) (0.282) (0.007) (0.008) 
ROA 0.001 0.029*** 0.027*** 
  
  
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
  
  
Leverage -0.345 -0.521*** -0.678*** -8.202*** -2.573 -0.020 0.028 
 
(0.298) (0.168) (0.181) (1.487) (1.792) (0.043) (0.048) 
Age -0.030 -0.006 -0.004 -0.120 -0.047 -0.013* -0.016* 
 
(0.072) (0.039) (0.040) (0.320) (0.378) (0.008) (0.009) 
Size 0.047 -0.195*** -0.169*** -0.842*** -1.258*** -0.002 -0.013*** 
 
(0.045) (0.019) (0.019) (0.160) (0.183) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital expenditures 0.011 0.003 -0.013*** 0.112*** -0.080* 0.004*** 0.003** 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.048) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D expenditures 0.033** 0.025*** 0.018** -0.071 0.095 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.060) (0.070) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.671 5.689*** 5.637*** 27.414*** 35.570*** 0.490*** 0.503*** 
 
(0.899) (0.605) (0.618) (5.041) (5.943) (0.131) (0.148) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,459 1,450 1,450 1,872 1,442 1,764 1,460 
Number of firms 489 485 495 631 494 605 499 
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TABLE 13 
Political charitable donations and firm value (IV approach) 
The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q, ROA, or yearly sales growth, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates are based on 
a 2SLS instrumental variable regression, with the first stage regression reported in the first column. The instrumental variable 
is the year’s average political donations by industry peers in the same country. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 First stage Second stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 
Political 
donations Tobin's Q 
Future 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Future 
ROA 
Sales 
growth 
Future sales 
growth 
                
IV: Political donations by local 
industry peers 
0.892*** 
      
(0.086) 
      
Predicted political donations 
 
47.263 -9.967 198.918 -41.498 -4.756 1.995 
  
(47.601) (11.550) (241.961) (172.611) (3.688) (2.311) 
ROA 0.000 0.022*** 0.034*** 
  
  
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) 
  
  
Leverage 0.001 0.075 -0.501*** -7.298*** -0.178 -0.038 -0.034 
 
(0.006) (0.381) (0.132) (1.970) (1.647) (0.039) (0.031) 
Age 0.002 -0.156 0.023 -0.349 0.921 -0.002 -0.020** 
 
(0.002) (0.196) (0.053) (1.106) (1.133) (0.015) (0.008) 
Size 0.001 -0.344** -0.085** -1.441** -2.178*** 0.015 -0.016* 
 
(0.001) (0.157) (0.039) (0.651) (0.413) (0.014) (0.008) 
Capital expenditures -0.000 0.003 0.004 0.220*** 0.018 0.006*** 0.003** 
 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.004) (0.044) (0.041) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D expenditures 0.001* -0.027 0.037*** -0.263 -0.057 0.006 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.058) (0.013) (0.224) (0.137) (0.005) (0.003) 
Constant -0.030 9.644** 3.136*** 35.985* 44.450** 0.097 0.611*** 
 
(0.025) (4.894) (1.011) (20.239) (17.293) (0.352) (0.220) 
Industry and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, 
R&D investments) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,734 2,467 2,313 2,821 2,298 2,729 2,324 
Number of firms 657 602 585 659 580 655 588 
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TABLE 14 Diff-in-Diff: 
Political donations around 2010 UK elections 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Year variables are dummies that equal one if for 
the reflected years and zero otherwise. .Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions 
are presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Variables Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
      
Political donations 0.190 -2.026 
 
(2.135) (2.404) 
Political donations * Year 2010  0.774  
 
(1.699)  
Year 2010 0.137***  
 
(0.024)  
Political donations * Year 2010 or later 
 
0.114 
  
(3.576) 
Year 2010 or later 
 
0.088*** 
  
(0.033) 
ROA 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Government holdings -0.128 -0.259 
 
(0.404) (0.455) 
Leverage 0.455* 0.478* 
 
(0.261) (0.263) 
Age -0.061 -0.052 
 
(0.057) (0.057) 
Size -0.280*** -0.283*** 
 
(0.058) (0.058) 
Capital expenditures 0.009** 0.010*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
R&D expenditures 2.279 2.257 
 
(1.805) (1.824) 
Constant -19.681*** -18.920*** 
 
(1.721) (1.701) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Other control vars. (GDP, R&D investments Yes Yes 
Observations 1,761 1,761 
Number of firms 318 318 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions Source 
Corporate philanthropy variables  
    Total charitable donations 
 
   
Donations to charitable (i.e. tax-exempt) organizations: sum of 
cash charitable donations and in-kind charitable donations, scaled 
by sales: log(1 + total donations / sales) x 103  w
 
ASSET4 
    In-kind charitable donations In-kind donations to charitable (i.e. tax-exempt) organizations: 
pro-bono services, products, volunteer work, support of research, 
shares, and other non-cash assets. Scaled by sales: log(1 + in-
kind donations / sales) x 103  w 
ASSET4 
    Cash charitable donations Cash donations to charitable (i.e. tax-exempt) organizations: 
direct cash giving and cash giving via a corporate foundation. 
Scaled by sales: log(1 + cash donations / sales ) x 103  w 
ASSET4 
    Political donations Expenditures on political lobbying: support of political 
candidates and contributions to parties, scaled by sales: log(1 + 
political donations / sales) x 103  w 
ASSET4 
    Corporate foundation Equals 1 if firm has established a corporate foundation (separate 
legal entity, that is exempt from paying taxes, receives funding 
from parent company, and is usually controlled by parent 
company’s employees or directors (Petrovits, 2006)). 
ASSET4 
   
Corporate financial performance  variables 
    Tobin’s Q Market value over book value of total assets: ((total assets – book 
value of common equity + market value of common equity) / 
total assets)  w 
Worldscope 
    ROA Net income / book value of total assets w Worldscope 
    Sales growth Yearly growth in net sales: ln(sales year t / sales year t-1)  w Worldscope 
   
Internal governance variables   
    Staggered board  Equals 1 if all board members are not individually subject to re-
election every year because of a staggered or classified board 
structure 
ASSET4 
    Majority requirement Equals 1 if shareholders ability to amend corporate charters or 
bylaws is limited by a supermajority or qualified majority vote 
requirement  
ASSET4 
    M&A limitation Equals 1 if  shareholder rights to vote on significant company 
transitions such as M&As are limited, e.g. by a supermajority 
requirement or no rights to vote  
ASSET4 
    Golden parachute Equals 1 if firm has a severance agreement that provides benefits 
to management/board members in the event of firing, demotion, 
or resignation following a change in control 
ASSET4 
    Poison pill Equals 1 if a shareholder right is triggered in the event of an 
unauthorized change in control that makes the target company 
financially unattractive or dilutes the voting power of acquirer 
ASSET4 
    E-index Managerial entrenchment reflected by the entrenchment index as 
defined by Bebchuk et al. (2009): sum of the five internal 
corporate governance dummy variables above 
Own 
    Board size Logarithm of total number of members of the board directors ASSET4 
    CEO-chair duality Equals 1 if chairman of the board is also (ex-)CEO ASSET4 
    Anti-takeover devices Number of other anti-takeover devices (e.g. limitation of director 
liability, people pill, customer refund program) in place in excess 
of two.  
ASSET4 
    Dual class shares Equals 1 if company has a dual class share structure ASSET4 
   
External governance variables 
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    Largest shareholder Percentage of ownership (i.e. cash-flow rights) held by the direct 
shareholder with the most voting rights 
ASSET4 
    Ownership concentration Degree to which direct and indirect ownership is concentrated in 
hands of single shareholder. Equals 0 for independent firm: no 
shareholder with < 25% of direct or total ownership; equals 1 if 
minority owned: at least one shareholder with >25% of direct or 
total ownership; equals 2 if indirectly majority owned: one 
shareholder with >50% of total ownership; equals 3 if directly 
majority owned: one shareholder with >50% of direct ownership. 
Orbis 
    Control wedge Largest shareholder’s cash-flow rights minus its voting rights ASSET4 
    Government holdings Ownership percentage by government or government institutions 
holding more than 5% 
ASSET4 
    Industrial owner Equals 1 if ultimate owneruo is an industrial company. Orbis 
    Institutional owner Equals 1 if ultimate owneruo is a bank, insurance company, 
financial company, private equity firm, venture capitalist, hedge 
fund, or mutual/pension fund.   
Orbis 
    Individual/family owner Equals 1 if ultimate owneruo is one or more named individuals or 
families. 
Orbis 
    State owner Equals 1 if ultimate owneruo is a public authority, state, or 
government. 
Orbis 
   
Firm level variables  
    Leverage Long-term debt / total assets  Worldscope 
    Age Logarithm of number of years since firm incorporation Orbis 
    Size Logarithm of firm’s total assets book value (in USD) Worldscope 
    Capital expenditures Capital expenditures / total assets  w Worldscope 
    R&D expenditures R&D expenditures / sales  w Worldscope 
   
    Industry dummies Based on industry classifications by NACE Rev. 2 Orbis 
   
Country level variables 
    ADRI Anti-director rights index: shareholder legal protection against 
management, based on Spamann’s (2010) corrected version of 
the original index by La Porta et al. (1998). High value is high 
level of investor protection. Index is based on 3 dummy variables 
related to shareholder voting (voting by mail, voting without 
blocking of shares, and calling an extraordinary meeting) and 3 
variables related to minority protection (proportional board 
representation, preemptive rights, and judicial remedies) 
Spamann (2010) 
    Country dummies Based on country classifications by Reuters Worldscope 
    GDP per capita Logarithm of GDP divided by midyear population (in current 
USD) 
Worldbank 
W = winsorized at the 1% level to account for extreme outliers.  UO = Ultimate owner is shareholder with highest direct or total % of 
ownership, but at least 25%. If this highest shareholder does not have an owner holding more than 25% of his shares, the shareholder 
is considered as independent and defined as the ultimate owner of the subject company. The process is repeated until the final ultimate 
owner is identified (and not further ultimate owner can be identified higher up in the pyramid. 
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